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Texas Gulf Sulphur’s bold ultimatum—”disclose or abstain”— enjoys
an enduring place of prominence in discussions of insider trading law be-
cause of the intuitive simplicity with which it asserts the expectations of
investors in securities markets. As the law of information dissemination has
developed into a distinct subset of federal securities law over the past fifty
years, however, it is equally important to reflect on how the Texas Gulf
Sulphur opinion has shaped the views of courts and regulators in crafting
rules and guidelines for information disclosure. Indeed, Texas Gulf
Sulphur anticipated—and continues to inform—contemporary debates re-
lating to the dissemination of real-time material information, including
questions such as how and how much material, nonpublic information
should be disclosed to the public, who is in a position to make effective
“disclosures” that satisfy the “disclose or abstain” rule, and the standard
for determining when new information may be acted upon by insiders.
Even as its influence over insider trading doctrine has waned, Texas Gulf
Sulphur’s aspirational standard of “equal access to material information”
continues to fuel the imagination of investors and policy makers in regulat-
ing twenty-first century securities markets.
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FEW formulas in corporate law offer the reductive grace of the “dis-close or abstain” rule,1 as popularized by Texas Gulf Sulphur.2 TheSecond Circuit’s opinion sets forth the premises of its test with in-
tuitive simplicity: investors have a “justifiable expectation” that “all in-
vestors trading on impersonal exchanges have relatively equal access to
material information.”3 Accordingly,
anyone in possession of material inside information must either dis-
close it to the investing public, or, if he is disabled from disclosing it
in order to protect a corporate confidence, or he chooses not to do
so, must abstain from trading in or recommending the securities con-
cerned while such inside information remains undisclosed.4
Despite half a century of guidance from the U.S. Supreme Court on the
scope of insider trading liability since then,5 Texas Gulf Sulphur contin-
ues to dominate business associations and securities casebooks because of
its bold ultimatum concerning the integrity of markets and the expecta-
tions of investors.6 The part of the case that calls to me when I teach it is
the framing of the choice to “disclose” material nonpublic information: it
is easy enough to understand what it means to “abstain,” but how does
one “disclose”—or more precisely, under what circumstances is dissemi-
nation of non-public information sufficient to cure otherwise privileged
trading?
On the one hand, the answer is straightforward: “[b]efore insiders may
act upon material information, such information must have been effec-
tively disclosed in a manner sufficient to insure its availability to the in-
vesting public.”7 The Texas Gulf Sulphur opinion nevertheless anticipates
many of the questions of the dissemination of real-time material informa-
tion that regulators and academics grapple with as part of the emerging
study of information dissemination as a distinct subset of securities law.8
1. See SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 848 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert.
denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
2. See Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228, 236 (2d
Cir. 1974) (referring to “our ‘disclose or abstain’ rule” as articulated in Texas Gulf
Sulphur); Fridrich v. Bradford, 542 F.2d 307, 318 (6th Cir. 1976) (referring to “the ‘abstain
or disclose’ rule in” SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur).
3. Texas Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d at 848.
4. Id.
5. See Salman v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 420, 427–28 (2016) (holding that “a tipper
breaches a fiduciary duty by making a gift of confidential information to ‘a trading rela-
tive,’” regardless of whether the tipper receives “something of a ‘pecuniary or similarly
valuable nature’ in exchange”); United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 665 (1997) (up-
holding criminal liability under the “misappropriation theory” of insider trading); Dirks v.
SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 664 (1983) (holding “that there must be a breach of the insider’s fiduci-
ary duty before the tippee inherits the duty to disclose or abstain”).
6. See, e.g., Wendy Gerwick Couture, Professor Alan R. Bromberg and the Scholarly
Role of the Treatise, 68 SMU L. REV. 703, 705–06 (2015) (noting the influence of the Texas
Gulf Sulphur case on Professor Bromberg’s vision for a securities law treatise).
7. Texas Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d at 854.
8. See ONNIG H. DOMBALAGIAN, CHASING THE TAPE: INFORMATION LAW AND POL-
ICY IN CAPITAL MARKETS 163 (2015); Kevin S. Haeberle & M. Todd Henderson, Informa-
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These include issues such as how material, nonpublic information should
be disclosed to the public, the extent to which disclosure is an option for
insiders or derivative insiders without executive authority, and the stan-
dard for determining when new information may be acted upon by
insiders.
Our understanding of some of these questions has evolved over the
past fifty years, while others remain the topic of significant uncertainty.
Nevertheless, both the SEC’s regulatory policy and ensuing federal juris-
prudence on disclosure mechanisms, selective disclosures, and outsider
trading each owe a great deal to the aspirational “equal footing” for in-
siders and outsiders that the SEC fought for (and which the Second Cir-
cuit endorsed) in Texas Gulf Sulphur.9
I. HOW IS MATERIAL, NONPUBLIC INFORMATION
DISCLOSED TO THE PUBLIC?
The process of disclosure undertaken by the defendants in Texas Gulf
Sulphur seems hopelessly primitive by today’s standards. Put aside for a
moment the “gloomy” April 12 statement made by Texas Gulf Sulphur’s
executive vice president, Charles Fogarty, relating to the K-55-1 drill
core10—and the cacophony of opinions it elicited from the en banc
court—as to materiality, accuracy, and completeness.11 The very mechan-
ics of the “ultimate disclosure of the discovery” of the 25 million ton ore
strike to the press, the financial community, and the public are a stark
contrast to the protocols that publicly traded companies follow today
when disseminating material information.
How did Texas Gulf Sulphur bring the news of the ore strike to mar-
ket? According to the court, a reporter for the Canadian mining industry
journal, The Northern Miner, was granted permission to visit the drillsite,
interview Texas Gulf Sulphur principals, and prepare an article on April
13. The reporter’s take, “after having been submitted to Mollison [a vice
president at Texas Gulf Sulphur] and returned to the reporter un-
amended on April 15,” was eventually published in the journal on April
16.12 Meanwhile, “[a] statement relative to the extent of the discovery . . .
was given to the Ontario Minister of Mines for release to the Canadian
media.”13 The ministry was expected to release the announcement
drafted by Texas Gulf Sulphur “over the airways” at 11 P.M. on April
15,14 but the ministry did not act until 9:40 A.M. on April 16, and even
tion-Dissemination Law: The Regulation of How Market-Moving Information Is Revealed,
101 CORNELL L. REV. 1373, 1376–84 (2016).
9. See Texas Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d at 852.
10. Id. at 845–46.
11. See id. at 864 (Friendly, J., concurring); id. at 869 (Kaufman, J., concurring); id.
(Anderson, J., concurring); id. (Hays, J., concurring); id. at 870 (Moore, J., dissenting).
12. Id. at 846.
13. Id.
14. Id.
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then only issued an “abbreviated announcement.”15
Management’s “official detailed statement” was read to “representa-
tives of [the] American financial media from 10:00 A.M. to 10:10 or 10:15
A.M. on April 16.”16 The statements thereafter “appeared over Merrill
Lynch’s private wire at 10:29 A.M. and, somewhat later than expected,
over the Dow Jones ticker tape at 10:54 A.M.”17 Meanwhile, parts of the
Northern Miner article and the ministry’s report “had sporadically
reached New York on the morning of the 16th through reports from Ca-
nadian affiliates to a few New York investment firms.”18
We have since grown accustomed to thinking of the release of new in-
formation to market as a highly regulated process that prevents exactly
this kind of haphazard dissemination of information. Today, an issuer
proposing to disseminate material information during trading hours
would be expected to alert the primary exchange where its securities
trade to determine whether a regulatory halt should be instituted across
the national marketplace.19 The information itself would be included in
an SEC current report furnished to or filed with the Commission and
broadly disseminated to the media.20 This protocol gives market partici-
pants “time to assess the impact of the news” and recalibrate buying and
selling interest once any trading halt is lifted.21
The coordinated dissemination of new information and the free, instan-
taneous public disclosure system we expect today is itself the product of
decades of innovation.22 The SEC had uncertain authority to coordinate
trading activity across exchanges prior to the authorization of the na-
tional market system in the 1975 Amendments to the Securities Exchange
Act.23 Until the Internet gained widespread use and the SEC’s EDGAR
system replaced paper disclosures with electronic filings, major brokerage
15. Id. at 853–54.
16. Id. at 846.
17. Id. at 846–47.
18. Id. at 853–54.
19. See, e.g., NYSE LISTED CO. MANUAL § 202.06(B) (Dec. 4, 2017), 1991 WL
11236725, at *2 (requiring listed issuers to “notify the Exchange by telephone at least ten
minutes prior to release of the announcement” of material news so that the Exchange can
locate the information and make a determination whether to halt trading); see also SEC. &
EXCH. COMM’N, TRADING HALTS AND DELAYS, https://www.sec.gov/fast-answers/answers
tradinghalthtm.html (last visited Mar. 28, 2018).
20. Form 8-K, 17 C.F.R. § 249.308 (2017), is used for the current reports required by
17 C.F.R. § 240.13a-11 or § 240.15d-11 and for reports of nonpublic information required
to be disclosed by Regulation FD, 17 C.F.R. §§ 243.100 and 243.101.
21. TRADING HALTS AND DELAYS, supra note 19.
22. See, e.g., Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 64 Fed. Reg. 72,590, 72,593
(proposed Dec. 28, 1999) [hereinafter Regulation FD Proposing Release] (“A generation
ago, issuers may have relied on conferences attended by a handful of interested parties, or
news releases that led to delayed, indirect retransmission of information to the public.”).
23. Securities Acts Amendments of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94–29, § 6, 89 Stat. 97 (1975)
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78k–1 et seq.). See Joel Seligman, The Future of the
National Market System, 10 J. CORP. L. 79, 81 (1984) (noting the “difficult technical
problems and policy decisions,” as well as “political” obstacles, “involved in converting a
system of unaffiliated securities exchanges and over-the-counter markets into a national
market system”).
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firms—or wirehouses24—served as a necessary intermediary for transmit-
ting real-time information to investment professionals, while manage-
ment shared fundamental information with analysts at private
conferences for filtration to the public.25 Retail investors, of course, re-
lied on print media—i.e., articles and stock quotes in newspapers—to
make investment decisions.
If the informational advantages that insiders and professionals enjoyed
over the common investor were a palpable reality then, today’s informa-
tional asymmetries are relatively subtle, yet equally compelling. Auto-
mated information technology has not eliminated—so much as
rescoped—the problem of informational asymmetries in markets.26 High-
end traders—such as investment banks and hedge funds—have heavily
invested in algorithmic technology that can instantaneously pull, parse
and act on electronic disclosures from the SEC and other public sources
of information without human intervention.27 Exchanges, moreover, have
wrestled with the problem of balancing commercial incentives to provide
privileged access to their members against their quasi-public mandate to
promote fair and honest markets.28
The SEC’s long-term strategy in the face of these new technologies,
informed by Texas Gulf Sulphur and its progeny, is to “promote fair
treatment of large and small investors by, among other things, giving all
investors timely access to the material information an issuer chooses to
disclose.”29 But making information available to all investors simultane-
24. See Definition of Wirehouse, FIN. TIMES, http://lexicon.ft.com/term?term=Wire
house [https://perma.cc/99HX-QPU3] (last visited Apr. 5, 2018) (“A wirehouse is a large
integrated broker with a national, as opposed to regional, business. Wirehouses once col-
lected trade orders from branch offices in distant cities using dedicated telegraph lines”).
25. See, e.g., Regulation FD Proposing Release, supra note 22, at 72,593
(“[R]evolutions in communications and information technologies have made it much easier
for issuers today to disseminate important information broadly and swiftly. A generation
ago, issuers may have relied on conferences attended by a handful of interested parties, or
news releases that led to delayed, indirect retransmission of information to the public.”).
26. See DOMBALAGIAN, supra note 8, at 163–78 (2015); Yesha Yadav, How Al-
gorithmic Trading Undermines Efficiency in Capital Markets, 68 VAND. L. REV. 1607, 1611,
1664 (2015) (arguing that while “algorithms help markets make gains on several measures
of informational efficiency, they also create costs for their ability to allocate capital
productively”).
27. See, e.g., Chris Brummer, Disruptive Technology and Securities Regulation, 84
FORDHAM L. REV. 977, 1001 (2015) (observing “the increasing dependence on, and de-
ployment of, computers and computer processing to not only execute trades and collect
market data but to also make independent trading decisions”); Yadav, supra note 26, at
1625–31 (describing various algorithmic trading strategies).
28. Brummer, supra note 27, at 1028–31 (describing how “individually and collec-
tively, maker-taker fees, colocation services, and private data feeds reflect the dis-
intermediation of exchanges . . . and, by extension, regulatory gatekeepers”); Yesha Yadav,
Insider Trading and Market Structure, 63 UCLA L. REV. 968, 968 (2016) (analogizing the
informational harms from such “structural insider trading” to those “regulated under con-
ventional theories of corporate insider trading”).
29. Regulation FD Proposing Release, supra note 22, at 72,593–94 (adding that “early
insider trading case law [citing Texas Gulf Sulphur] . . . appeared to require that traders
have equal access to corporate information,” though later cases determined that “the an-
tifraud provisions of the securities laws do not require that all traders possess equal infor-
mation when they trade”).
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ously is a deceptively difficult mandate.30 The SEC’s principal regulatory
instrument for doing so is Regulation Fair Disclosure (FD).31 But “fair
disclosure” is not synonymous with simultaneity; even putting aside the
problem of “promptly” correcting inadvertent disclosures, it is not clear
how “broad, non-exclusionary distribution”32 of material information can
realistically be achieved in today’s informational landscape without creat-
ing informational winners and losers.33
The problem of course is that issuers have too many dissemination
tools at their disposal—EDGAR, websites, social media, and other
“push” technologies—all of which have their unique protocols and strate-
gic corporate uses. While disclosure policy might favor the use of the
SEC’s EDGAR system for dissemination of new information,34 it cannot
chill the use of alternative information channels in a robust informational
marketplace. Indeed, an issuer ought to be obligated to release news
“through the fastest possible means,” whatever it is.35 As such, the SEC
has cautioned issuers that public investors must be aware of, and have
access to, websites that are to be used as tools of information dissemina-
tion.36 Further, issuers must avoid alternative disclosure tools—such as
social media—that have more limited distribution or may not be gener-
ally recognized as dissemination tools.37
30. See 15 U.S.C. § 78m(l) (2012) (authorizing the SEC to adopt rules requiring re-
porting issuers to “disclose to the public on a rapid and current basis such additional infor-
mation concerning material changes in the financial condition or operations of the issuer”).
31. Regulation FD, 17 C.F.R. § 243.100 et seq. (2017).
32. 17 C.F.R. § 243.101(e)(2) (2017).
33. Haeberle & Henderson, supra note 8, at 1417–18 (observing that Regulation FD
“results in asymmetries throughout prolonged periods that are slightly lower than they
otherwise would be in the period leading up to full releases of new information . . . , yet
markedly higher ones in the period that takes place just after those full releases (because
the information comes out with a burst of trading when it must be made available to all at
once when first released)”).
34. Regulation FD requires an issuer to make public disclosure by furnishing or filing
Form 8-K, subject to an exemption “if it instead disseminates the information through
another method (or combination of methods) of disclosure that is reasonably designed to
provide broad, non-exclusionary distribution of the information to the public.” 17 C.F.R.
§§ 243.101(e)(1)–(2).
35. See, e.g., NYSE LISTED CO. MANUAL § 202.06(C) (Dec. 4, 2017), 1991 WL
11236725, at *3 (“News which ought to be the subject of immediate publicity must be
released by the fastest available means. The fastest available means may vary in individual
cases and according to the time of day. Typically, this requires that issuers either (i) include
the news in a Form 8-K or other SEC filing, or (ii) issue the news in a press release to the
major news wire services, including, at a minimum, Dow Jones & Company, Inc., Reuters
Economic Services and Bloomberg Business News.”).
36. See Commission Guidance on the Use of Company Web Sites, Release No. 58288,
73 Fed. Reg. 45,862 (Aug. 7, 2008) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 241 & 271). For example, in
determining whether information posted on a website satisfies the “public disclosure” re-
quirements of Rule 101(e), “companies must consider whether and when: (1) [a] company
[w]eb site is a recognized channel of distribution, (2) posting of information on a company
[w]eb site disseminates the information in a manner making it available to the securities
marketplace in general, and (3) there has been a reasonable waiting period for investors
and the market to react to the posted information.” Id. at 45,867.
37. See Report of Investigation Pursuant to § 21(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934: Netflix, Inc., and Reed Hastings, Release No. 69279 (Apr. 2, 2013), 2013 WL
5138514, at *3–7.
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Even the SEC’s proprietary information dissemination tools can result
in informational asymmetries. For example, a recent study demonstrates
that the SEC’s file transfer protocol and public dissemination services
themselves, until recently, gave professional investors lead time sufficient
to earn trading profits.38 Moreover, some scholars have questioned the
premise that investors are better off with assurances of exacting informa-
tional symmetry, given the volatility that surrounds the release of new
information, the effort required to digest it, and the technological re-
sources needed to exploit instantaneity.39
Efforts making information more readily actionable in order to im-
prove the speed with which information is impounded into market prices
may have the same effect. The SEC’s Office of Structured Disclosure, for
example, “supports the Commission’s efforts to make required disclo-
sures accessible and usable by structuring disclosures using a variety of
standardized languages and frameworks.”40 These include the establish-
ment of an XBRL filing program for corporate financial statements.41
The effect of these initiatives on trading markets is unclear: while they
ostensibly promote market efficiency, they may also have the effect of
scaring retail investors out of markets in the wake of new disclosures.42
II. HOW MUCH “DISCLOSURE” IS ENOUGH?
Texas Gulf Sulphur itself is a puzzlement insofar as it is not clear what
ought to have been disclosed to satisfy the “disclose or abstain” rule. The
majority suggested that the objective “that access to material information
be enjoyed equally” could have been satisfied by “nothing more than the
disclosure of basic facts,” permitting outsiders to draw upon their evalua-
tive expertise.43 In dissent, Judges Moore and Lumbard questioned the
“full disclosure theory” advocated by Judge Waterman and the majority,
by asking the following question: Would disclosure of the facts developed
38. See Robert J. Jackson & Joshua R. Mitts, How the SEC Helps Speedy Traders
8–12, (Columbia Univ. Sch. of Law, Center for Law & Econ. Studies, Working Paper No.
501, 2014), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2520105 [https://perma.cc/
8NCA-SFRP].
39. See Haeberle & Henderson, supra note 8, at 1379–80.
40. SEC. AND EXCH. COMM’N, STRUCTURED DISCLOSURE AT THE SEC: HISTORY AND
RULEMAKING, https://www.sec.gov/page/osdhistoryandrulemaking [https://perma.cc/6YSP-
YQE3] (last visited Mar. 28, 2018).
41. See Interactive Data To Improve Financial Reporting, Release No. 9002, 74 Fed.
Reg. 6776 (Feb. 10, 2009) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 228, 230, 232, 239, 240, 249).
42. One study found “an increase in information efficiency, a decrease in event return
volatility, and a reduction of change in stock returns volatility” in the post-XBRL disclo-
sure of sampled firms. Joung W. Kim et al., The Effect of First Wave Mandatory XBRL
Reporting across the Financial Information Environment, 26 J. INFO. SYS. 127, 127 (2012).
Another attributed wider abnormal bid–ask spreads, a reduction in abnormal liquidity, and
a decrease in abnormal trading volume, particularly for small trades, in the market imme-
diately following the introduction of XBRL tagging to retail investors’ heightened fears of
adverse selection. See Elizabeth Blankespoor et al., Initial evidence on the market impact of
the XBRL mandate, 19 REV. ACCT. STUD. 1468, 1468 (2014).
43. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 849 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert.
denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
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as of the time the alleged insider trading began “have given the buying or
selling public the so-called advantages possessed by the insiders?”44
Judge Moore seemed to deride the idea that factual disclosure of the
circumstances surrounding the K-55-1 discovery in late 1963 would have
satisfied the majority: indeed, he argued that a detailed factual exposition
of the technical findings “would, of course, have been of no value to any-
one except possibility a few graduates of Institutes of Technology,” while
observing that “any announcement of the discovery of a remarkable mine
would have been both false and misleading” at the time.45 Indeed, the
dissent turned the SEC’s own disclosure guidance against it, noting that
“under the Commission’s own standards, [Texas Gulf Sulphur], if it re-
vealed any information during the November 1963-April 1964 period,”
would have had to temper the reporting of any finds with the caution that
“‘no body of commercial ore is known to exist on the property.’”46
The dissenters further questioned whether the majority fairly drew the
line between the “superior financial or other expert analysis” of an in-
sider expert’s “educated guesses or predictions” from the “basic facts” of
the discovery.47 They recounted a “myriad of reasons” in the public do-
main that insiders might have given in addition to the K-55-1 find to moti-
vate their purchases, including “the development of a phosphate project
and potash mine,” an anticipated “turnabout in the price of sulphur
stocks,” “the new high level of free world sulphur use and output,” and
“the launching of the world’s largest liquid sulphur tanker” to name a
few.48 The dissent cautioned that the majority “confuse[d] the inducing
motive of the individual purchaser with knowledge of material facts
which ought to be revealed to the public at large.”49
Much of this discussion naturally anticipates theories of materiality that
prosecutors would articulate to assess the collective import of individually
immaterial tidbits of non-public information slotted together to make
trading decisions. Certainly, the majority in Texas Gulf Sulphur gave
great weight to insiders’ own estimation of the materiality of information
based on their own trading activity.50 From the perspective of non-insid-
44. Id. at 875 (Moore, J., dissenting).
45. Id.
46. Id. at 873.
47. Id. at 848–49.
48. Id. at 876.
49. Id. at 876–77.
50. See id. at 851 (noting that “a major factor in determining whether the K-55-1 dis-
covery was a material fact is the importance attached to the drilling results by those who
knew about it”). More recent cases addressing the materiality of information compiled by
employees or other putative insiders include SEC. v. Steffes, 805 F. Supp. 2d 601, 613
(N.D. Ill. 2011) and SEC Charges Former Investment Banker with Insider Trading, SEC
Litig. Release No. 22674 (Apr. 16, 2013), https://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2013/lr
22674.htm [https://perma.cc/AG5D-6T82] (announcing settlement). One commentator has
suggested that, at least with respect to cases of trading by insiders directly, such cases tend
to ground their arguments in the “misappropriation” theory of insider trading liability. See
Allan Horwich, The Mosaic Theory of Materiality—Does the Illusion Have a Future?, 43
SEC. REG. L.J. 1, 7 (2015).
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ers, however, building a mosaic of information through expert networks
is part of analysts’ mission to “ferret out and analyze information” to
make trading decisions.51 Despite the SEC’s efforts to provide clarity
through Regulation FD,52 some commentators continue to analogize the
task of corporate executives engaging with financial analysts “to a fencing
match conducted on a tightrope.”53
III. CAN ANYONE “DISCLOSE”?
In promulgating the “disclose or abstain” rule, the Second Circuit did
not purport to “suggest that material facts must be disclosed immedi-
ately,” but rather reaffirmed that “the timing of disclosure is a matter for
the business judgment of the corporate officers entrusted with the man-
agement of the corporation within the affirmative disclosure require-
ments promulgated by the exchanges and by the SEC.”54 Invoking the
“traditional fiduciary concepts” upon which the Supreme Court would
later ground its insider trading jurisprudence, the court admitted that an
insider who “is disabled from disclosing [information] in order to protect
a corporate confidence, or who chooses not to do so, must abstain from
trading” while the information remains undisclosed.55
For employees without the authority to speak for the firm, disclosure is
probably not a realistic option without breaching their duties of loyalty
and care as agents or fiduciaries of the issuer. The SEC’s admonition that
any spokespersons for public companies “need to be mindful of [their]
obligations under the federal securities laws when making statements that
can reasonably be expected to be made known to the market” essentially
limits formal disclosures to a chosen few.56 Even internal disclosures can
be problematic: the court was split over the conduct of two officers—
Stephens and Fogarty—who accepted stock option grants from the board
of directors while in possession of information about the K-55-1 hole.57
The dissenters suggest that the majority’s decision “places insider recipi-
51. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 658 (1983).
52. The SEC has acknowledged that absent an improper purpose, “an issuer is not
prohibited from disclosing a non-material piece of information to an analyst, even if, unbe-
knownst to the issuer, that piece helps the analyst complete a ‘mosaic’ of information that,
taken together, is material.” Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. 51,716,
51,722 (Aug. 24, 2000) (final rule adopting Regulation FD, 17 C.F.R. § 243.100 et seq.).
53. SEC v. Bausch & Lomb Inc., 565 F.2d 8, 9 (2d Cir. 1977) (adding that executives
are “compelled to parry often incisive questioning while teetering on the fine line between
data properly conveyed and material inside information that may not be revealed without
simultaneously disclosing it to the public”); see also JOHN J. HUBER & THOMAS J. KIM,
THE SEC’S REGULATION FD – FAIR DISCLOSURE 7 (2001) (“As the fencing match be-
tween companies and analysts continues in the FD environment, new techniques, such as
embargoes, may develop that comply with Regulation FD, yet nevertheless give analysts
an advantage over the public.”).
54. Texas Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d at 850–51 n.12.
55. Id. at 848.
56. Public Statements by Corporate Representatives, 49 Fed. Reg. 2468, 2469 (Jan. 20,
1984) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 231, 241, 251, 271 (citing Tex. Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d at
858–60)).
57. Texas Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d at 864–65 (Friendly, J., concurring).
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ents . . . in a difficult dilemma,” insofar as they must decide whether to
“perform the uncommon act of refusing such an option, promoting specu-
lation as to the reasons therefor, or accept the option and face possible
10b-5 liability.”58
Congress and the SEC have provided only limited and narrowly tai-
lored guidance to corporate directors and executive officers since Texas
Gulf Sulphur. In addition to requiring more timely and accessible publi-
cation of trades,59 Congress and the SEC have adopted rules for directors
and officers prohibiting the abuse of blackout periods.60 More generally,
the SEC has promulgated conditions for pre-clearance of trading plans to
avoid allegations of improper trading.61 Nevertheless, the broad net cast
by Texas Gulf Sulphur may cause issuers to “adopt overbroad insider
trading compliance programs, which comes at a heavy price in terms of
corporate culture, cost of compensation, share liquidity, and cost of
capital.”62
The U.S. Supreme Court could have answered this question in Dirks v.
SEC, where the SEC had censured the petitioner for openly discussing
with a number of his clients and investors material non-public informa-
tion he had obtained from corporate insiders, who were anxious to blow
the whistle on an ongoing fraud at a publicly traded company.63 The Su-
preme Court ultimately reversed Dirks’s censure because insiders had not
shared information with Dirks for an “improper purpose.”64 The Dirks
Court, however, avoided a more interesting question: Whether a
whistleblower or outsider in possession of inside information could effec-
tively disclose under the “disclose or abstain” rule when she does not
control the tools of information dissemination?65
58. Id. at 877 (Moore, J., dissenting).
59. See 15 U.S.C. § 78p(a) (2012); Mandated Electronic Filing and Web Site Posting
for Forms 3, 4 and 5, 68 Fed. Reg. 25,788 (May 13, 2003) (mandating electronic filing via
EDGAR of insider trading reports required under § 16 of the Exchange Act).
60. See Regulation BTR, 17 C.F.R. § 245.101 (2018) (prohibiting directors and execu-
tive officers of an issuer from trading in the issuer’s equity securities during a pension plan
“blackout period”).
61. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-1(c)(1)(i)(A), (B) (2017) (establishing an affirmative defense
to insider trading if the accused, inter alia, “adopted a written plan for trading securities”
prior to becoming aware of material non-public information that effectively eliminates the
accused’s discretion over the amount, price, or timing of trades).
62. John P. Anderson, Solving the Paradox of Insider Trading Compliance, 88 TEMP.
L. REV. 273, 274–75 (2016).
63. See 463 U.S. 646, 648–52 (1983).
64. Id. at 659–77.
65. Certainly, the Supreme Court seemed to regard Secrist’s role as a whistleblower as
absolving him of any deceptive breach of fiduciary duty, without specifically considering
whether his conduct would have been actionable under agency principles generally. See id.
at 667 n.27 (finding “no evidence that Secrist’s disclosure was intended to or did in fact
‘deceive or defraud’ anyone” as required to establish scienter). Even so, the groundrules
for whistleblowing might well counsel against such attempts at public disclosure today:
prospective whistleblowers have an incentive to disclose violative conduct privately
through government or corporate channels in order to claim statutory protection from re-
taliation or to avoid personal liability for breach of non-disclosure agreements. See 18
U.S.C. § 1514A(a)(1) (2012) (protecting from retaliation whistleblowers who report infor-
mation to a federal regulatory or law enforcement agency, Congress, or a supervisor); 15
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For example, what efforts on Secrist’s or Dirks’s part would have been
enough to allow trading thereafter? Certain “[p]erson[s] acting on behalf
of an issuer”66 are subject to the obligation to comply with specific disclo-
sure protocols when communicating material information to investment
professionals or shareholders.67 The regulation provides no such guidance
to non-officers, however, which leaves the “disclose or abstain” rule as a
frustrating concept to apply: is Dirks prohibited from advising his clients
to dump their Equity Funding shares because he has just enough inside
information to know there is a fraud brewing, but not enough to persuade
a reputable publisher to publish it? If so, can one be “tainted” by knowl-
edge of information that cannot be effectively published?68
Obiter, the dueling opinions of the Supreme Court commented on
Dirks’ alacrity in communicating the fraud to the public. The majority
observed that Dirks was “in touch regularly with William Blundell, the
Wall Street Journal’s Los Angeles bureau chief,” whom Dirks urged to
write a story on the fraud allegations. “Blundell did not believe, however,
that such a massive fraud could go undetected and declined to write the
story,” for fear that “publishing such damaging hearsay might be
libelous.”69 The dissent was somewhat less impressed: they described
Dirks’s telephone-tag with the Wall Street Journal to be “feeble, at best,”
and observed that the trading halt at the New York Stock Exchange oc-
curred “at about the same time Dirks was talking to Los Angeles SEC
personnel.”70
Even if an insider were to attempt disclosure, it is not clear whether
subjective belief or the purity of intent is enough to absolve them of the
duty to abstain if disclosure is not effective. For example, in Texas Gulf
Sulphur, the court concluded that “the beliefs of Coates, Crawford and
U.S.C. § 78u-6(a)(6) (2012) (defining whistleblowers as “any individual who provides . . .
information relating to a violation of the securities laws to the Commission”); see also
Digital Realty Tr., Inc. v. Somers, 138 S.Ct. 767, 778 (2018) (holding that the Dodd-Frank
Act’s anti-retaliation provision, 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h), does not extend to an individual who
has not reported a violation of the securities laws to the SEC); Kathryn Hastings, Keeping
Whistleblowers Quiet: Addressing Employer Agreements to Discourage Whistleblowing, 90
TUL. L. REV. 495, 509–19 (2015) (discussing the difficulties of balancing corporate nondis-
closure agreements with statutory whistleblower protections).
66. Regulation FD defines a “[p]erson acting on behalf of an issuer” to mean “any
senior official of the issuer . . . , or any other officer, employee, or agent of an issuer who
regularly communicates” with shareholders or certain investment professions described in
Rule 100(b)(1). 17 C.F.R. § 243.101(c). Notably, “[a]n officer, director, employee, or agent
of an issuer who discloses material nonpublic information in breach of a duty of trust or
confidence to the issuer shall not be considered to be acting on behalf of the issuer.” 17
C.F.R. § 243.101(c)
67. Regulation FD requires that the issuer simultaneously or promptly disseminate
information through a Form 8-K or other method “reasonably designed to provide broad,
non-exclusionary distribution of the information to the public.” 17 C.F.R. § 243.101(e).
68. See Andrew Verstein, Insider Tainting: Strategic Tipping of Material Nonpublic In-
formation, 112 NW. U. L. REV. 725, 748 (2018) (suggesting that management can trip up
bidders in the market for corporate control through selective disclosure of non-public
information).
69. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 649–50.
70. Id. at 670.
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Clayton that the news of the ore strike was sufficiently public at the time
of their purchase orders are to no avail if those beliefs were not reasona-
ble under the circumstances.”71 Moreover, the court suggested that
“whether the case before us is treated solely as an SEC enforcement pro-
ceeding or as a private action, proof of a specific intent to defraud is un-
necessary” in insider trading cases.72 Later cases would return to the issue
whether intent to use inside information for purposes of reaping trading
profits is necessary.73 The SEC ultimately codified its position that trad-
ing while “aware” of material nonpublic information was sufficient to
find liability,74 while successfully defending the “knowing possession”
standard in the context of tender offers.75
IV. WHEN IS “DISCLOSURE” EFFECTED?
Perhaps the only recourse is to wait until disclosure of the information,
by whomever or whatever means, is complete. The defendants who
traded on April 15th and 16th unsuccessfully argued that their purchases
did not violate Rule 10b-6 because news of the strike “had already been
effectively disclosed” prior to placing their orders.76 “Crawford tele-
phoned his orders to his Chicago broker about midnight on April 15 and
again at 8:30 in the morning of the 16th, with instructions to buy at the
opening of the Midwest Stock Exchange that morning.”77 Coates placed
his telephone order with his son-in-law Haemisegger shortly after leaving
the Texas Gulf Sulphur press conference around 10:20 A.M. on the 16th;
Haemisegger and his customers also purchased 1,500 additional shares
shortly before 10:20 A.M. on April 16.78 A third insider, who was not a
party to the appeal, acted after the news appeared over the Dow Jones
71. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 856 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert.
denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
72. Id. at 854–55. Indeed, the Court aggressively suggested that “the common law
standard of deceptive conduct has been modified in the interests of broader protection for
the investing public so that negligent insider conduct has become unlawful.” Id.
73. See, e.g., United States v. Teicher, 987 F.2d 112, 120 (2d Cir. 1993) (suggesting that
“knowing possession” is sufficient to trigger insider trading liability, without any proof of a
“causal connection” to the trade); SEC v. Adler, 137 F.3d 1325, 1340 (11th Cir. 1998) (re-
quiring the SEC to prove that material nonpublic information was “used in the trade,”
which could be inferred from an “insider’s possession of material nonpublic information at
the time of a trade”); United States v. Smith, 155 F.3d 1051, 1067 (9th Cir. 1998) (finding
that “the weight of authority supports a ‘use’ requirement”); see also Regulation FD Pro-
posing Release, supra note 22, at 72,600.
74. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-1(b) (providing that “a purchase or sale of a security of
an issuer is ‘on the basis of’ material nonpublic information about that security or issuer if
the person making the purchase or sale was aware of the material nonpublic information
when the person made the purchase or sale”).
75. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3(a) (prohibiting trading in possession of material infor-
mation relating to a tender offer if the trader “knows or has reason to know” the informa-
tion is nonpublic and has been acquired from certain transaction participants); United
States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 666–77 (1997).
76. Texas Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d at 853.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 847, 853–54.
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broad tape.79
While Coates was “absolved” by the district court because the an-
nouncement had already been made,80 the Second Circuit showed little
sympathy. The court opined that even if “the contents of the official re-
lease could instantaneously be acted upon, at the minimum Coates should
have waited until the news could reasonably have been expected to ap-
pear over the media of widest circulation.”81 More importantly, “where a
formal announcement to the entire financial news media had been prom-
ised in a prior official release known to the media, all insider activity must
await dissemination of the promised official announcement.”82
Obliquely, the court recognized that merely completing the mechanics
of disclosure might not be enough, and that a “reasonable waiting pe-
riod”83 might be necessary for markets to digest the information dis-
closed. Discussing the fate of the third insider, the court noted “in passing
that, where the news is of a sort which is not readily translatable into
investment action, insiders may not take advantage of their advance op-
portunity to evaluate the information by acting immediately upon dissem-
ination.”84 This question, “the permissible timing of insider transactions
after disclosures of various sorts,” the court deferred to the expertise of
the SEC, in the hope that it would utilize its rule-making power “in the
future to provide some predictability of certainty for the business
community.”85
The SEC has never acted on the court’s entreaty. Instead, citing Texas
Gulf Sulphur, the SEC has maintained that “[i]nformation is nonpublic if
it has not been disseminated in a manner making it available to investors
generally,”86 and that information is deemed published only once it is
effectively “disseminated and absorbed” by the market.87 Meanwhile,
courts have taken the lead in enmeshing theories of market efficiency
into Rule 10b-5 actions in deciding when information is “impounded”
into the market price in an efficient market regardless of efforts at public
79. Id. at 854 n.18.
80. Id. at 854 (citing SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 258 F. Supp. 262, 288–89
(S.D.N.Y. 1966), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968) (“Since TGS’s
announcement had been made when Coates telephoned Haemisegger, he did not violate
Section 10(b) or Rule 10b-5.”)).
81. Texas Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d at 854.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 854 n.18.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,721 (citing Texas Gulf
Sulphur, 401 F.2d at 854).
87. SEC Release Notice, In re Faberge, Inc., Release No. 10174 (May 25, 1973), 1973
WL 149283, at *6 (noting that “meaningful public disclosure” requires both that informa-
tion is “disseminated in a manner calculated to reach the securities [marketplace] in gen-
eral through recognized channels of distribution, and public investors must be afforded a
reasonable waiting period to react to the information”); see Bradley J. Bondi & Steven D.
Lofchie, The Law of Insider Trading: Legal Theories, Common Defenses, and Best Prac-
tices for Ensuring Compliance, 8 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 151, 170 (2011) (describing the SEC’s
steadfast adherence to the “dissemination and absorption” theory).
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disclosure.88 As such, much like the “truth on the market” defense in
securities fraud actions,89 defendants may well have to make educated
guesses about the effectiveness of “disclosure” when trading on the basis
of material information.
Professor Bromberg counseled that “[f]or the cautious insider, waiting
for the morning newspaper to carry the information is almost certainly
safe” and that “waiting for fifteen minutes after the tape runs is probably
sufficient.”90 Scholars have not been able to find much better guidance in
the ensuing years; as Bondi and Loftchie note, “[o]ver the last two de-
cades, courts have found that periods for information to become public
range from [fifteen] minutes, to a day, or even several days after the in-
formation has been released.”91 Moreover, the SEC has suggested, citing
Texas Gulf Sulphur, that the “nature and complexity of information” may
require an even longer period.92
V. THE LEGACY OF TEXAS GULF SULPHUR
As a rule for guiding insider trading policy, Texas Gulf Sulphur’s influ-
ence has arguably waned considerably. U.S. Supreme Court jurispru-
dence has chosen to hinge insider trading liability on the deception of
information producers, rather than expectations of information users,93
and the SEC has followed suit in its own rulemaking.94 As a principle of
regulatory policy, however, Texas Gulf Sulphur remains just as relevant—
and controversial—today as it did in 1968.
If the Securities Act articulated a vision of “full and fair disclosure,”
and the Exchange Act one of “fair and honest markets,” Texas Gulf
Sulphur has infused the SEC’s corporate disclosure and market structure
policy with an admittedly “utopian dream of information parity among
88. See, e.g., United States v. Libera, 989 F.2d 596, 601 (2d Cir. 1993) (noting that once
“information is fully impounded in price, such information can no longer be misused by
trading because no further profit can be made.”).
89. See Wielgos v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 892 F.2d 509, 516 (7th Cir. 1989) (not-
ing that “[p]rompt incorporation of news into stock price is the foundation for the fraud-
on-the-market doctrine and therefore supports a truth-on-the-market doctrine as well”).
90. ALAN BROMBERG ET AL., BROMBERG & LOWENFELS ON SECURITIES FRAUD
§ 6:236 (2d ed. 2017) (quoted in Billard v. Rockwell Int’l Corp., 526 F. Supp. 218, 220
(S.D.N.Y. 1981), aff’d, 683 F.2d 51 (2d Cir. 1982)).
91. Bondi & Lofchie, supra note 87, at 172.
92. Commission Guidance on the Use of Company Web Sites, Release No. 58288, 73
Fed. Reg. 45,862, 45,867–68 (Aug. 7, 2008) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 241 & 271) (citing
SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 854 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert. denied, 394
U.S. 976 (1969)).
93. See United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438, 448–49 (2d Cir. 2014), abrogated by
Salman v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 420 (2016) (“Although the Government might like the
law to be different, nothing in the law requires a symmetry of information in the nation’s
securities markets”); see also supra, note 5.
94. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-1(a) (prohibiting trading on the basis of material nonpub-
lic information “in breach of a duty of trust or confidence that is owed . . . to the issuer . . .
or the shareholders of that issuer, or to any other person who is the source” of the
information).
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investors,”95 but one that continues to capture the popular imagination as
new and bedazzling asymmetries of information are cultivated and mined
for profit.96 The sparring opinions of the Texas Gulf Sulphur court were
not blind to the implications of their bold statement, as well as the rela-
tive institutional competence of courts, legislators and regulators “to
bring some semblance of order by means of workable rules and regula-
tions” in the areas of disclosure policy and insider trading.97 Perhaps one
day, the SEC’s information policy will outpace developments in informa-
tion technology by developing principles for anticipating and addressing
permissible and impermissible information asymmetry. Until then, Texas
Gulf Sulphur will occupy a prominent place in law school casebooks and
curricula and inspire new generations of securities lawyers and scholars to
consider the implications of information dissemination for market
integrity.
95. James D. Cox, Insider Trading and Contracting: A Critical Response to the ‘Chi-
cago School’, 1986 DUKE L.J. 628, 631 (1986).
96. See generally MICHAEL LEWIS, FLASH BOYS: A WALL STREET REVOLT (2014).
97. See Texas Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d at 889 (Moore, J., dissenting).
